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There is a rich literature on Quantitative Easing (QE) but less so on its unwinding. QE was initiated in 2001 in Japan, followed by the US in 2008 after the Global Financial Crisis, and there has been time to evaluate it, while there has not been any sustained unwinding of QE so far. The only episode that approaches an unwinding of QE is the so-called ‘Taper Tantrum’ in the United States in 2013, when Treasury yields surged on the news that the Federal Reserve would be slowing down its purchases of bonds. In this article, I survey the literature on QE and use the findings to discuss possible exit strategies. While there is little consensus among central bankers on the optimal exit strategy, what stands out is that the road to unwinding will probably be a long and uncertain one, and central banks may even keep large amount of government bonds permanently on their balance sheet. The channels of Quantitative Easing Quantitative easing is the process whereby a central bank purchas...

In this conference organized by the Economic Chamber of Greece on 24 November 2020, we presented joint NIESR and CEPS work on debt sustainability analysis (presented by Cinzia Alcidi) and the macroeconomic and fiscal path (presented by Corrado Macchiarelli and myself) during the three adjustment programmes from 2010 to 2018 in Greece. The panel included Yiannis Stournaras, Governor of the Bank of Greece, Christos Staikouras, Minister of Finance of the Hellenic Republic and former Ministers of Finance Euclid Taskalotos and Evangelos Venizelos. The topics discussed included (in no particular order): Should the debt relief have come earlier? Should private sector involvement have been done earlier? Was the length and severity of the adjustment programmes appropriate? Was the mix of expenditure cuts and tax rises appropriate? Should public investment have been ring-fenced? Were the fiscal multipliers underestimated? Was the EU framework appropriate to manage such crisis? European Stability...

The COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to have a significant impact on medium-run inflation expectations particularly if considered in conjunction with large fiscal stimuli, ultra-loose monetary policies and the risk of de-globalization. The recent review of monetary policy framework by the Federal Reserve, focusing on an average inflation target strategy, highlights how difficult it can be to keep inflation expectations well-anchored when secular factors are at play (i.e. decline in the neutral real rate of interest , r*) and a shock of the scale of COVID-19 hits the economy, with ensuing uncertainty. This blog post was written with my colleague Corrado Macchiarelli and also published on  NIESR's blog  and  LSE's blog . Several factors could “in theory” light inflation expectations up over the medium-term There are many factors that play into the formation of inflation expectations. The large government stimuli, for instance, may have the effect of increasing the ba...

As part of NIESR's quarterly World Forecast, you will find a link to a box co-written by my colleagues Corrado Macchiarelli, Barry Naisbitt and myself about the risk of 'Japanisation' for the US and Euro Area economies. Here is an extract. Since the financial crisis, the Euro Area and US economies have had a period during which their economies showed some of the same characteristics as Japan. This note examines their experience in the context of whether they are en route to Japanisation. We conclude that the period from 2013 to 2016 was very similar to that situation but that the US has now clearly moved away from that experience. The Euro Area, however, while it cannot be described as having suffered Japanisation, has not moved as decisively away from that experience.

In recent years, the yield curve has flattened and shifted downwards. The flattening has received a lot of attention because it is viewed as a recessionary signal. In this article, we argue that the fact that the curve has shifted downwards as well as flattening indicates that the yield curve may have changed regime. This regime shift seems to have been caused by lower inflation expectations and lower risk premia. In an environment of lower inflation and lower risk premia, the yield curve may occasionally invert without signalling a recession as it did in 1966. 1. The recessionary signal Inversions of the yield curve have often been used to predict recessions. The 10-year to 3-month spread between US Treasury yields became briefly negative twice this year in March and the May (figure 1), spurring debate about whether this was signalling a forthcoming recession. The negative spread was mainly the result of a decrease of the 10-year yield – from 2.8 per cent on 1 March to 2.4 per cen...

Post date: 11 Feb 2019 As images of unrest in the streets of Paris and other French cities continue to flood in the European media, the data on France contained in our latest global forecast, published last week, painted a subtler but still concerning outlook for the French economy. GDP growth was at 1.5 per cent in 2018 and recent developments suggest that the acceleration in growth in 2019 that we were previously expecting may not occur. We have therefore downgraded our forecast of annual GDP growth from 1.9 to 1.6 per cent in 2019. Turner's famous yellow A broad range of surveys point to a marked and sudden deterioration in the business environment and consumer confidence. The business climate composite indicator, a survey of business managers compiled by INSEE, declined in December 2018 to a two-year low and the composite PMI dropped in December from 54.2 to 48.7, below the 50 mark which indicates expansion. Social protests represented by the ‘gilets jaunes’ movemen...